Supreme court rejects case of former sailor with stress disorder - Compaction Plate
Posted by djgsoe on Tuesday, November 20, 2012
The Supreme Court on Monday rejected the petition of a former Navycorpsman who had received a court-martial in 2010 for striking twosuperior noncommissioned officers while on duty. The former sailor,Osborn Miranda, had argued that his guilty plea in the case was notvalid because he suffered from both post-traumatic stress disorderand bipolar disorder. During the guilty-plea inquiry, a militaryjudge did not delve into the disorders, thereby ignoring a possibledefense or a limit of culpability, Mr. Miranda argued. The petition to the Supreme Court was being closely watched bylawyers who represent current service members and veterans becauseit related to guilty pleas from people who had post-traumaticstress disorder or bipolar disorder.
The specific questionpresented to the court was: Are post-traumatic stress disorder andbipolar disorder substantial issues that a military judge mustconsider before accepting a service member s guilty plea, whenthose disorders may have contributed to the charged misconduct? A Supreme Court ruling on the issue might have been of particularinterest in the case of Staff Sgt. Robert Bales, the soldiercharged with murdering 17 Afghan villagers. Though Sergeant Baleshas not pleaded guilty in the case, his lawyer has suggested thathe may have been suffering from P.T.S.D. or some other disorderthat might constitute a defense or limit his culpability. Although the Supreme Court denied Mr. r.
Miranda's petition forreview, the issue presented in the case remains relevant andcontroversial. If a military defendant is suffering from P.T.S.D.or related symptoms, does that fact raise substantial questions ofculpability that the judge must take into consideration, even ifthe defendant has pleaded guilty? And a corresponding question iswhether military judges should be allowed to base adefendant's mental responsibility on the results of teststhat were designed hundreds of years ago for issues of legalinsanity. Are those questions and their answers definitive intoday's environment of P.T.S.D., bipolar disorder and otherdisorders? If the Supreme Court had agreed to hear the case, it might haveprovided some guidance in answering these questions. Mr.
Miranda, who was an E-3 in the Navy, pleaded guilty in 2010 tousing disrespectful language toward a superior noncommissionedofficer and striking two superior noncommissioned officers whilethey were in the execution of their offices. Before the trial, thecourt ordered an evaluation of Mr. Miranda s mental competency andmental responsibility. The conclusions in the report submitted tothe court were that he did not have a severe mental disease ordefect, and that he was able to appreciate the nature andwrongfulness of his conduct in spite of his disorders.
Additionally, the report said at the time of the trial that Mr.Miranda was not suffering from a mental disease or defect thatwould render him unable to understand the nature of the proceedingsagainst him, or be unable to cooperate intelligently in hisdefense. An underlying issue in this case may be whether thesepossibly antiquated questions meant to cover an insanity defenseare appropriate to judge mental responsibility with the heightenedattention that P.T.S.D. and bipolar disorders have received duringthe last decade of war. On appeal of the case, Mr.
Miranda submitted that the militaryjudge abused his discretion in accepting the guilty plea by notasking during the guilty-plea inquiry about references during thetrial to Mr. Miranda s bipolar and post-traumatic stress disordersand their possible effect on his ability to appreciate thewrongfulness of his acts. In essence, Mr. Miranda asserted that hisguilty pleas were "improvident" under Article 45(a) ofthe Uniform Code of Military Justice.
On Sept. 6, 2011, the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court ofCriminal Appeals held that the military judge did not abuse hisdiscretion by accepting Mr. Miranda's guilty pleas, since thejudge was not required to inquire into a possible mentalresponsibility defense. The United States Court of Appeals for theArmed Forces, or CAAF, agreed to review the case and summarilyaffirmed the decision of the Navy-Marine Corps Court of CriminalAppeals. see more:Selecting And Get The Great Cheap Jerseys For Online
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The specific questionpresented to the court was: Are post-traumatic stress disorder andbipolar disorder substantial issues that a military judge mustconsider before accepting a service member s guilty plea, whenthose disorders may have contributed to the charged misconduct? A Supreme Court ruling on the issue might have been of particularinterest in the case of Staff Sgt. Robert Bales, the soldiercharged with murdering 17 Afghan villagers. Though Sergeant Baleshas not pleaded guilty in the case, his lawyer has suggested thathe may have been suffering from P.T.S.D. or some other disorderthat might constitute a defense or limit his culpability. Although the Supreme Court denied Mr. r.
Miranda's petition forreview, the issue presented in the case remains relevant andcontroversial. If a military defendant is suffering from P.T.S.D.or related symptoms, does that fact raise substantial questions ofculpability that the judge must take into consideration, even ifthe defendant has pleaded guilty? And a corresponding question iswhether military judges should be allowed to base adefendant's mental responsibility on the results of teststhat were designed hundreds of years ago for issues of legalinsanity. Are those questions and their answers definitive intoday's environment of P.T.S.D., bipolar disorder and otherdisorders? If the Supreme Court had agreed to hear the case, it might haveprovided some guidance in answering these questions. Mr.
Miranda, who was an E-3 in the Navy, pleaded guilty in 2010 tousing disrespectful language toward a superior noncommissionedofficer and striking two superior noncommissioned officers whilethey were in the execution of their offices. Before the trial, thecourt ordered an evaluation of Mr. Miranda s mental competency andmental responsibility. The conclusions in the report submitted tothe court were that he did not have a severe mental disease ordefect, and that he was able to appreciate the nature andwrongfulness of his conduct in spite of his disorders.
Additionally, the report said at the time of the trial that Mr.Miranda was not suffering from a mental disease or defect thatwould render him unable to understand the nature of the proceedingsagainst him, or be unable to cooperate intelligently in hisdefense. An underlying issue in this case may be whether thesepossibly antiquated questions meant to cover an insanity defenseare appropriate to judge mental responsibility with the heightenedattention that P.T.S.D. and bipolar disorders have received duringthe last decade of war. On appeal of the case, Mr.
Miranda submitted that the militaryjudge abused his discretion in accepting the guilty plea by notasking during the guilty-plea inquiry about references during thetrial to Mr. Miranda s bipolar and post-traumatic stress disordersand their possible effect on his ability to appreciate thewrongfulness of his acts. In essence, Mr. Miranda asserted that hisguilty pleas were "improvident" under Article 45(a) ofthe Uniform Code of Military Justice.
On Sept. 6, 2011, the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court ofCriminal Appeals held that the military judge did not abuse hisdiscretion by accepting Mr. Miranda's guilty pleas, since thejudge was not required to inquire into a possible mentalresponsibility defense. The United States Court of Appeals for theArmed Forces, or CAAF, agreed to review the case and summarilyaffirmed the decision of the Navy-Marine Corps Court of CriminalAppeals. see more:Selecting And Get The Great Cheap Jerseys For Online
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